How Russia Is Dodging Export Controls, And Why It Matters for Global Trade

Over the past few years, international sanctions have aimed to squeeze Russia’s access to critical goods, from oil shipping to advanced tech. But here’s the reality: Russia has gotten really good at finding workarounds.

Whether it’s crude oil slipping through “shadow fleets,” tech components entering through third countries, or obscure trade networks hiding true end-users, the Russian sanctions evasion playbook is getting more sophisticated by the day.

In this blog, we break down how it’s happening, who’s involved, and why it’s a growing concern for global supply chain compliance.

The Shadow Fleet: How Russian Oil Keeps Flowing Despite Sanctions

Let’s start with oil, the backbone of Russia’s economy.

Despite Western bans, Russian crude keeps flowing, thanks to a massive "shadow fleet" of over 400 tankers. These ships:

• Sail under sketchy flags of convenience
• Switch off tracking systems
• Swap cargo mid-ocean in ship-to-ship transfers
• They are often old, uninsured, and poorly maintained

It’s a murky game that not only undermines sanctions but also creates serious environmental and legal risks for buyers who don’t vet their suppliers thoroughly.

Meet 2Rivers: Russia’s Invisible Export Arm

2Rivers Trading (formerly Coral Energy) has intentionally stayed under the radar, but its influence is anything but small. Headquartered in Dubai, the company operates a fleet of more than 100 vessels and has quietly positioned itself as a key facilitator of Russian oil exports, despite ongoing international sanctions. The firm has been sanctioned by the UK for its close affiliations with Russian state-owned enterprises.

What makes 2Rivers particularly elusive is its use of an intricate network of shell companies, designed to obscure the true origin and ownership of oil shipments. This layered corporate structure significantly hinders transparency and enforcement, effectively enabling the company to function as a sophisticated vehicle for sanctions evasion.

How Dual-Use Tech is Slipping Through the Cracks

It’s not just oil. Russia has also been quietly sourcing dual-use technology items that can be used in both civilian and military products. Over 135 non-Russian entities have been flagged for helping in this, including dozens of companies in China.

These items enter through indirect routes, sometimes rebranded or funneled through middlemen, making it incredibly difficult to pin down the end-user. So, that seemingly harmless industrial chip made in Europe? It might end up inside a Russian drone.

Emerging Trade Intermediaries: Vietnam, Serbia, Turkey, and Other Key Hubs

Sanctioned goods don’t usually take a direct route into Russia. Instead, they pass through “friendly” or “neutral” countries that aren’t fully aligned with Western sanctions—places like:

• Vietnam
• Serbia
• Turkey
• Kazakhstan

Once there, items are often repackaged, relabeled, or rerouted to mask their final destination. The EU’s 17th sanctions package even named firms in these countries for helping Russia bypass restrictions.

A Russian national was recently sentenced in the U.S. for exporting restricted aviation technology and laundering money in the process. But here’s the kicker: he used U.S.-based front companies and seemingly legitimate intermediaries. In other words, you could be working with a sanctioned network and not even know it.

What Can You Do About It?

Trademo Map helps you:

• Trace your upstream supply chain, not just Tier-1 suppliers

• Spot links to sanctioned entities like 2Rivers

• Monitor shipment patterns that point to transshipment or evasion

• Map ownership-based risks to uncover who truly controls your vendors